Objectives. This study adapted the Launay Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS) to measure predisposition to auditory and visual hallucinations and examine the relationship between meta-cognition and predisposition in a non-psychiatric population. It also tested the hypothesis that individuals highly predisposed to hallucination would show positive and negative meta-cognitive beliefs and report the use of diåerent thought control strategies.
Recently, there has been a growing interest in the measurement of psychotic traits among general population samples (Claridge et al., 1996) . Much of this work has been done by attempting to assess schizotypy, or psychosis-proneness, which appears to be of heterogeneous structure, consisting of four components that have been replicated ; these are, aberrant perceptions and beliefs, cognitive disorganization, introvertive anhedonia and asocial behaviour (Bentall, Claridge, & Slade, 1989 ; Claridge et al., 1996) . Interestingly, the ®rst three components of these schizotypal traits correspond very closely to the three syndromes found by Liddle (1987) in his study of schizophrenic symptoms in diagnosed patients (these were positive symptoms, negative symptoms and conceptual disorganization). Scales have been designed to measure predisposition to speci®c positive symptoms of schizophrenia, such as hallucinations (Launay & Slade, 1981) or paranoia (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) . As a result of such advances in the measurement of psychotic experiences in the general population, there is now an opportunity to examine psychological factors contributing to psychosis-proneness in such samples.
Hallucinations in non-clinical subjects
There is some evidence that auditory hallucinations are a normal psychological phenomenon and there is a long tradition of viewing hallucinations as being on a continuum with normal functioning (Strauss, 1969) . Studies assessing the prevalence of auditory hallucinations in college students have consistently found that a large minority (37±39 %) report experiencing such phenomena (Barrett & Etheridge, 1992 ; Posey & Losch, 1983) , and that these experiences were unrelated to incipient psychopathology. Studies of diåerent populations have certainly found that the experience of hearing one's thoughts spoken aloud (a Schneiderian ®rst rank symptom of schizophrenia) is a relatively common one that is endorsed by over 30% of respondents (Launay & Slade, 1981 ; Posey & Losch, 1983) . Surveys of hallucinatory experiences suggest that 10±25% of the general population have had such experiences at least once (Slade & Bentall, 1988) and that the annual incidence rate is 4±5 % (Tien, 1991) . When considered together, these ®ndings do suggest that the hypothesis that auditory hallucinations are normal phenomena is a plausible one.
In addition, some researchers have examined the predisposition of non-psychiatric populations to hallucinations. Launay and Slade (1981) developed a 12-item questionnaire (LSHS) to assess hallucinatory predisposition that included both pathological and sub-clinical items and used this to test hypotheses regarding behavioural correlates of hallucinatory predisposition. Other researchers have used highly predisposed non-psychiatric participants to make inferences about the mechanisms underlying clinical symptoms. For example, Rankin and O'Carroll (1995) found that normal participants highly predisposed to hallucination (as measured by the LSHS) scored higher on a signal detection task measure of perceptual bias than those with lower predisposition, but that there was no diåerence on a measure of sensitivity, and concluded that this was more consistent with an account that suggests auditory hallucinations result from a bias in normal information processing rather than a de®cit in functioning.
Psychological theories of hallucinations
Several cognitive theories have accounted for the occurrence of hallucinations. Some authors have attempted to explain auditory hallucinations by supposing that they are internal cognitive events which are misattributed to an external source (Bentall, 1990 ; David, 1994 ; Frith, 1992 ; Hoåman, 1986 ; Morrison, Haddock, & Tarrier, 1995) . Some support for this comes from ®ndings that auditory hallucinations are accompanied by subvocalization or covert movements of the speech musculature (Gould, 1950 ; Inouye & Shimizu, 1970) , which also accompanies normal thinking or inner speech (McGuigan, 1978) . If auditory hallucinations are a type of inner speech which is misattributed to an external source, this would explain the ®nding that verbal tasks which block subvocalization also inhibit the occurrence of auditory hallucinations (Gallagher, Dinan, & Baker, 1994 ; Margo, Hemsley, & Slade, 1981) . However, while there is some agreement about the links between internal mental events and auditory hallucinations, there is still debate regarding the mechanisms that are involved in the development and maintenance of such misattributions.
A number of theorists have speculated that this misattribution is caused by a de®cit in some aspect of cognitive functioning, such as a di¬culty in the integration of stored material with current sensory input (Hemsley, 1993) , a disruption in language production processes (David, 1994 ; Hoåman, 1986) or a de®cit in internal monitoring (Frith, 1992) . Other theorists have suggested that auditory hallucinations result from biases of normal functioning. Bentall (1990) has argued that a hallucinator's tendency to misattribute internal events to an external source may re¯ect a bias in the monitoring of internal events that is in¯uenced by top-down processes including beliefs and expectations and that reinforcement processes are involved in the maintenance of such misattributions. Morrison et al. (1995) outlined an account which proposed that meta-cognitive beliefs inconsistent with intrusive thoughts lead to their external attribution as auditory hallucinations, and that such a misattribution is maintained by reducing cognitive dissonance; this is based upon a number of similarities in form and content between intrusive thoughts and auditory hallucinations. It is also suggested that the appraisal of the resulting hallucinatory experience elicits behavioural, emotional and physiological responses that may be involved in the maintenance process. Morrison et al. also speculate that a similar misattribution of intrusive imagery may be responsible for visual hallucinations. Wells and Matthews' (1994) self-referent executive function (S-REF) model can also be used as a framework for understanding hallucinations. This model suggests that vulnerability to psychological dysfunctions is associated with a cognitiveattentional syndrome characterized by heightened self-focused attention, attentional bias, ruminative processing and activation of dysfunctional beliefs. In this model, cognitive-attentional experiences, such as biased information processing and cognitive intrusions, are mediated by executive processes which are directed by the patients' beliefs. Some beliefs are meta-cognitive in nature and are linked to the interpretation, selection and execution of particular thought processes. Chadwick and Birchwood (1994) have demonstrated that beliefs about voices are meaningfully related to their emotional and behavioural consequences, and Wells and Butler (1997) have suggested that meta-cognitive beliefs about hallucinations will also in¯uence emotional and behavioural responses to them. In particular, positive beliefs may be associated with eåorts to engage and maintain particular hallucinatory experiences ; indeed, Chadwick and Birchwood (1994) found that voices believed to be benevolent were engaged. In addition, a study examining the attitudes of 50 psychiatric in-patients to their hallucinations found that over 50% reported some positive eåects of hallucinating, with the most commonly cited bene®ts being that the hallucinations were relaxing or soothing and that they provided companionship (Miller, O'Connor, & Di Pasquale, 1993) , supporting an association between positive beliefs and hallucinations.
In contrast, negative beliefs about hallucinations may be associated with unhelpful coping strategies. Chadwick and Birchwood (1994) found that voices believed to be malevolent were resisted by patients and it has been suggested that deliberate suppression of auditory hallucinations may be counterproductive (Morrison et al., 1995) . Positive and negative beliefs about thoughts may also be implicated in the development and maintenance of hallucinations. Baker and Morrison (1998) found that patients experiencing auditory hallucinations scored higher on meta-cognitive beliefs concerning both positive beliefs about worry and negative beliefs about uncontrollability and danger associated with thoughts; however, the mechanisms linking beliefs about thoughts with beliefs about hallucinations are unknown at present.
This study adapted the LSHS to measure the frequency of experiences that are predisposing to auditory and visual hallucinations. We tested the speci®c hypothesis that predisposition to hallucinatory experiences in normal participants is associated with positive beliefs about such experiences, independent of mood (anxiety and depression) and other schizotypal factors. We also tested the hypothesis that those individuals highly predisposed to hallucination will exhibit diåerent meta-cognitive beliefs about thoughts and use diåerent thought control strategies in comparison with individuals of low predisposition.
Method Participants
The number of participants completing the study was 105; all participants were undergraduate students or health professionals who volunteered to participate in the study. No ®nancial incentive was oåered. The mean age of the group was 30.4 (SD 5 9.3; range 20±57 years). The male : female ratio of the sample was 21: 84.
Materials
Revised Hallucination Scale. A 16-item questionnaire based upon the Launay Slade Hallucination Scale (Launay & Slade, 1981) . It was revised to incorporate additional items measuring predisposition to visual hallucination and to allow items to be endorsed using a 4-point scale to measure frequency (1 5 never, 2 5 sometimes, 3 5 often, 4 5 almost always) rather than a forced true} false response.
Visual Analogue Scales. Several 0±100 visual analogue scales were used to assess tendency towards depression (three measures assessing depressed mood, loss of interest and lack of pleasure) and positive and negative beliefs about unusual perceptual experiences (one measure for each). Participants indicated their responses by placing a mark on a 10-cm line anchored at`not at all ' and`could not be more so '. Positive beliefs were assessed with the item,`Unusual experiences, such as those mentioned in the previous questionnaire, are bene®cial and help me cope', and negative beliefs were assessed with the item,`Unusual experiences, such as those mentioned in the previous questionnaire, are potentially dangerous and interfere with my life ' (in both cases the previous questionnaire was the Revised Hallucination Scale).
Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) . Paranoid thought was measured using this self-report scale. It consists of 20 items and scores range from 20 to 100. ; Speilberger, Gorusch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) . Trait anxiety was measured using the trait anxiety sub-scale (version Y2) of this inventory. STAI trait scores range from 20 (almost never anxious) to 80 (almost always anxious). The sub-scale has an alpha of .90 in college students.
State±Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI
Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ ; Wells & Davies, 1994) . This is an instrument designed to measure strategies that are used to control unpleasant or unwanted thoughts. It consists of 30 items and comprises ®ve sub-scales : distraction, social control, punishment, worry and reappraisal. Each item is endorsed on a 4-point rating scale. Sub-scales exhibit acceptable internal consistency (alphas ranged between .64 and .79) and good test±retest reliability (coe¬cients ranged between .67 and .83). : Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997) . This scale measures metacognitive beliefs using 65 items. The questionnaire generates scores for the following ®ve sub-scales : (1) Positive beliefs about worry (typical items include`Worrying helps me to get things sorted out in my mind ' and`Worrying helps me cope ') ; (2) Negative beliefs about the controllability of thoughts and corresponding danger (typical items include`Worrying is dangerous for me ' and`I cannot ignore my worrying thoughts') ; (3) Cognitive con®dence (typical items include`I have a poor memory ' and`I have di¬culty knowing if I have actually done something, or just imagined it ') ; (4) Negative beliefs about thoughts in general, including responsibility, punishment and superstition (typical items includè Not being able to control my thoughts is a sign of weakness ' and`If I did not control a worrying thought, and then it happened, it would be my fault ') ; (5) Cognitive self-consciousness (typical items include`I think a lot about my thoughts' and`I pay close attention to the way my mind works'). Items are scored from 1 to 4, whereby 1 5`do not agree ', 2 5`agree slightly ', 3 5`agree moderately ', and 4 5`agree very much '. Sub-scales exhibited good internal consistency (alphas ranged between .72 and .89) and test±retest reliability (coe¬cients ranged between .76 and .94).
Meta-cognitions Questionnaire (MCQ

Procedure
Participants completed the questionnaires in the order listed above and returned them to the research assistant. The questionnaires took approximately 15 minutes to complete.
Data analysis
Several of the variables were not normally distributed, but were found to be normalizable using logarithmic transformations (auditory hallucinations, visual hallucinations, paranoia, negative beliefs about controllability and danger, positive beliefs about worry, beliefs about responsibility and superstition, beliefs about cognitive con®dence, distraction and worry) or square root transformations (depression). Parametric statistical analyses were performed using these transformed variables.
Results
Reliability and factor structure of revised LSHS
A factor analysis was conducted in order to determine whether predisposition to auditory and visual hallucinations were distinct traits. Two sub-scales were identi®ed by a factor analysis (principal components with OBLIMIN rotation) guided by the scree plot which clearly suggested a two-factor solution. One item (No. 11) was removed prior to factor analysis because of a lack of variance (all participants endorsed`never '). Criteria for de®ning the factors were as follows : items were required to load above 0.3 on a factor to contribute to it, and, because the aim was to identify distinct sub-scales, if an item loaded over 0.3 on both factors it only contributed to the factor it loaded highest on (if there was a diåerence of less than 0.1 in the loadings such items were excluded). After the application of these criteria, the two factors consisted of a 6-item sub-scale assessing predisposition towards visual hallucinations} disturbances (alpha 5 .75) and a 7-item sub-scale measuring tendency towards experiencing auditory or verbal hallucinations} daydreaming (alpha 5 .64). These two factors accounted for 38 % of the variance (27 % and 11% respectively), and were correlated (r 5 .31). The factor structure matrix is shown in Table 1 . It was noted that 24% of respondents endorsed responses suggesting that they experienced hearing a voice speaking their thoughts aloud at least sometimes. 
Eåects of positive beliefs about hallucinatory experiences
In order to examine the hypothesis that predisposition to hallucination is associated with positive beliefs about such experiences (independently of mood and schizotypy), two multiple regression analyses were conducted (one for auditory hallucinations and one for visual hallucinations).
Auditory hallucinatons. In order to investigate the relationship between mood, schizotypal factors, beliefs and predisposition to auditory hallucinations, a multiple regression analysis was performed using direct entry. The predisposition to auditory hallucinations} daydreams score was used as the dependent variable. The independent (or predictor) variables included in the analysis were the mood variables (trait anxiety and depression composite score) on step 1, schizotypal factors on step 2 (paranoia and predisposition to visual hallucinations} disturbances) and positive and negative beliefs about unusual perceptual experiences on step 3. The correlation matrix and the results of the ®nal multiple regression equation can be seen in Tables 2 and 3 respectively. The multiple R was .49 and signi®cant (F(6, 79) 5 4.12, p ! .002). The adjusted R # was .18 indicating that a moderate amount of the variance was accounted for by these predictor variables. An examination of the tolerances of the individual variables found them to be acceptably high, indicating that colinearity was not a problem. On step 1, with the mood variables entered, the multiple R was .16 and not signi®cant. On step 2, when the schizotypal variables were entered, the multiple R was .40 and signi®cant, the adjusted R # was .12 and the increment in R # of .13 was signi®cant (F 5 6.47, p ! .01). On the ®nal step, when the beliefs were entered, the increment in R # was .08 and signi®cant (F 5 4.05, p ! .05).
Visual hallucinations . We ran a similar regression with predisposition to visual hallucinations as the dependent variable. The independent variables included in the analysis were again, the mood variables (trait anxiety and depression composite score) on step 1, schizotypal factors on step 2 (paranoia and predisposition to auditory hallucinations} daydreams) and positive and negative beliefs about unusual perceptual experiences on step 3. The correlation matrix and the results of the ®nal multiple regression equation can be seen in Tables 2 and 4 respectively. The multiple R was .66 and signi®cant (F(6, 79) 5 10.0, p ! .0001). The adjusted R # was .39 indicating that a large amount of the variance was accounted for by these predictor variables. An examination of the tolerances of the individual variables found them to be acceptably high, indicating that colinearity was not a problem. On step 1, with the mood variables entered, the multiple R was .52 and signi®cant (F 5 15.08, p ! .001). On step 2, when the schizotypal variables were entered, the multiple R was .62 and signi®cant, the adjusted R # was .35 and the increment in R # of .12 was signi®cant (F 5 7.82, p ! .001). On the ®nal step, when beliefs were entered, the increment in R # was .5 and signi®cant (F 5 3.21, p ! .05).
It can be seen from these analyses that positive beliefs about hallucinatory experiences are indeed associated with predisposition to hallucination.
Meta-cognitive beliefs about thoughts
In order to investigate the relationship between meta-cognitive beliefs about intrusive thoughts} worry and predisposition to hallucinations, a multivariate analysis of variance was conducted using the sub-scales of the MCQ as the dependent variables and using high or low predisposition to hallucinations (employing a median split on total hallucination score) as the grouping factor. There was an overall signi®cant diåerence between the meta-cognitive beliefs of participants high and low in their predisposition to hallucinations (F(5, 87) 5 2.77, p ! .05). The results of the univariate comparisons are shown in Table 5 . 
Thought control strategies
We hypothesized that individuals high and low in predisposition to hallucinations would diåer in their use of thought control strategies. In order to examine the diåerences in use of self-regulatory thought control strategies between individuals with high or low predisposition to hallucination, a multivariate analysis of variance was performed. The overall level of predisposition (high or low as assessed by a median split on total score) was used as the between participants factor, and each of the ®ve sub-scales from the TCQ were the independent variables. There was a signi®cant diåerence between the strategies used overall by the two groups (F(5, 96) 5 2.51, p ! .05). The univariate comparisons are presented in Table 6 . 
Discussion
The results of the present study suggest that predisposition to auditory hallucinations} daydreams and visual hallucinations} disturbances are two distinct traits that can be distinguished with the modi®ed LSHS. The ®nding that daydreaming items loaded on the sub-scale assessing predisposition to auditory hallucinations suggests a potential common mechanism for these phenomena which is worthy of future investigation. This may be consistent with the view that auditory hallucinations may be equivalent to`dreaming awake ' (Kingdon & Turkington, 1993, p. 77) and thus implicate the failure of an inhibitory mechanism that is usually only`turned oå' during REM sleep as suggested by Asaad and Shapiro (1986) . The ®nding that 24 % of the respondents heard a voice speaking their thoughts aloud provides further support for the idea that hallucinatory experiences are normal, and that so-called ®rst rank symptoms of schizophrenia are present in a large minority of the general population. Consistent with predicitons based on the S-REF model (Wells & Matthews, 1994) , positive beliefs about unusual perceptual experiences were the best predictor of predisposition to auditory and visual hallucinations and participants who scored higher on predisposition to hallucination used diåerent thought control strategies and had diåerent meta-cognitive beliefs in comparison with participants of low predisposition.
The present data not only suggest that positive beliefs about hallucinations are associated with predisposition, but also that those participants highly predisposed to hallucination scored signi®cantly higher on cognitive self-consciousness and negative beliefs about uncontrollability and danger than those with a low predisposition (a ®nding that is consistent with Baker and Morrison's (1998) ®ndings in patients experiencing auditory hallucinations). Perhaps it is the co-occurrence of positive and negative beliefs which underlies the transition from normal to pathological hallucinatory experiences ; a similar co-existence of positive and negative beliefs (about worrying) has already been implicated in the development of problematic worry in generalized anxiety disorder (Wells, 1995) . The combination of positive beliefs about unusual perceptual experiences and negative meta-cognitive beliefs is consistent with the suggestion that hallucinations may be partially motivated and become distressing only when appraised as uncontrollable and dangerous (as suggested by Morrison, 1998) . These results are also consistent with other theories of hallucination that implicate meta-cognition (Bentall, 1990 ; Morrison et al., 1995) , and the observed combination of positive and negative beliefs may oåer some support for the view that cognitive dissonance may be involved in the development and maintenance of auditory hallucinations.
Individuals prone to hallucination also appear to use diåerent self-regulatory strategies for dealing with unwanted and distressing thoughts in comparison with less predisposed participants. Participants highly predisposed to hallucination use more punishment and reinterpretation strategies for controlling unwanted thoughts. Perhaps the execution of particular strategies increases the likelihood that thoughts are transformed into hallucinatory experiences (i.e. attributed to an external source).
The clinical implications of these ®ndings must be considered cautiously, as the participants were from a non-clinical population. However, if similar processes are involved in the development and maintenance of hallucinations in psychotic patients, then meta-cognitive beliefs and processes (particularly negative beliefs about controllability, responsibility and superstitiousness, positive beliefs about unusual perceptual experiences and cognitive self-consciousness) should be assessed and the modi®cation of such beliefs may result in improvements. Similarly, the control strategies used by patients may be maladaptive under some circumstances and the causes and consequences of their usage should be explored. These ®ndings would also suggest that it is important to assess the adaptive functions of hallucinations and provide patients with alternative ways of obtaining these functions before targeting interventions at the hallucinatory experiences.
There are a number of methodological limitations with this study that could be addressed in future research. There was no monitoring of illicit drug use by the participants, which could be a confounding factor that could, for instance, be expected to in¯uence the frequency of visual hallucinations and paranoia. In addition, no clinical sample was examined, so it is di¬cult to be sure that the predisposition of normal participants to diåerent types of hallucination is similar to that of psychotic patients. The analyses that employ a univariate median split as the grouping factor could be criticized by methodologists who argue that the arti®cial dichotomizing of variables is problematic as it results in loss of information ; however, the eåect of this is to reduce statistical power, so the signi®cant diåerences reported here are likely to be robust (for further discussion see Maxwell & Delaney, 1993) . Future research should examine distinctions between auditory hallucinations, daydreaming and visual hallucinations in greater detail. Finally, as this study used several measures relating to thoughts (i.e. MCQ, TCQ), future studies could develop measures of beliefs that speci®cally refer to hallucinations.
